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Porter coined the term ‘value chain’ in 1985. Since then the concept has found general acceptance within the 
strategic planning realm. In order to explain changes occurring in industries affected by increased volatility, a 
thesis of the deconstruction of the value chain is gaining acceptance. This concept is investigated by means of 
a literature review. The theory is then tested in the turbulent United Kingdom (UK) retail life insurance 
industry to see if an application can be found. This industry is briefly analysed and the main environmental 
factors affecting it are investigated. These are a £27 billion per annum savings gap, under-performing equity 
markets, regulatory influences of depolarisation, stakeholder’s pensions and technological developments 
mainly as a result of the Internet. The conclusion reached is that the changes are creating at least partial 
deconstruction. Within this framework the strategic options for new entrants into the UK retail life insurance 
market are explored.  
 
This paper is based upon a research project by Robert Dommisse, Value chain deconstruction in the United Kingdom 
Life and Pensions Industry and resulting strategic options for Sanlam, submitted in 2003 to the University of Stellenbosch 
Business School in partial fulfilment for the MBA degree. It was awarded a distinction. 
 
 





Since Porter coined the phrase ‘value chain’ in 1985 (Porter, 
1985:33) the world has experienced major change. With the 
rapid development and introduction of more advanced 
communication and computer technology in the latter part of 
the 1990s, industry models have changed. This gave rise to 
concepts such as the ‘new economy’ which suggested old 
rules and strategies were invalid. 
 
In trying to explain these changes in industry, a thesis that 
appears to be gaining broader acceptance is that of the 
‘deconstruction of the value chain’. The thinking is that 
whole industries may be reorganising and reconstructing and 
that companies need to adopt strategies around this in order 
to survive and prosper. 
 
This paper investigates the concept of the deconstruction of 
the value chain and explores the benefit it can add in 
strategy formulation by applying it to an industry that is 
deemed to be undergoing rapid change. For this purpose the 
retail life insurance business in the United Kingdom (UK) 
has been selected. Strategic options for a new entrant into 
the market are discussed.  
 
Structure of the paper and research methodology 
 
The paper briefly discusses the value chain. A literature 
review of deconstruction of the value chain follows. The 
retail life insurance industry in the UK is defined, its 
products listed and an industry value chain constructed. The 
external factors impacting on the UK retail life insurance 
value chain are discussed with specific reference to the 
impact on each major component of the value chain. A 
conclusion is drawn as to whether the chain is showing signs 
of deconstruction. The strategic options for new entrants in 
each part of the deconstructed chain are investigated.  
 
The main methodology used was a literature review of 
published works and research conducted by consulting 
companies. Discussions with senior managers of a major 
South African life insurer, who are currently working in the 
UK market or with previous exposure to this market, were 
used to augment and verify the understanding of the 
literature study. 
 
The value chain concept  
 
In ‘Competitive Strategy’ Porter (1980:39) defined the three 
generic strategies of overall cost leadership, differentiation 
and focus. In ‘Competitive Advantage’ (1985:33) he builds 
on these and shows how the organisation can achieve 
competitiveness by choosing its scope and the range of 
activities that it undertakes. In doing this he coined the term 
‘value chain’.  
 
The industry within which companies operate is termed the 




the combination of the value chains of companies 
comprising an industry. 
 
It appears that the term ‘value system’ has not found the 
general acceptance of the ‘value chain’. Later authors such 
as Evans and Wurster (1997:72) and Thompson and 
Stricland (2001:129) use the term ‘industry value chain’ 
when they refer to what Porter defined as the ‘value system’.  
 
Theory of value chain deconstruction 
 
As analysts, mainly in the management consulting arena, 
observed changes in industries resulting from, amongst 
other, the introduction of new technology and regulatory 
amendments, they noticed a phenomena where parts of the 
traditional industry value chain started breaking away and 
either forming new industries or combining with parts of 
different industries (Bresser, Heuskel & Nixon, 2000:1). 
This break up was given the label of ‘deconstruction’.  
 
Observing deconstruction alone, however, adds little to 
company strategy. In order to use deconstruction to gain 
strategic benefit, one must understand the reasons for 
deconstruction, which parts of the chain are most likely to 
be affected and how it can be used by the company to its 
advantage. 
 
The main theories relating to the reasons for value chain 
deconstruction of ‘rich versus reach’, ‘interaction versus 
transformation’ and ‘three businesses in one’ are 
investigated.  
 
Rich versus reach 
 
Evans and Wurster (1997:72) hold that the value chain has 
traditionally been defined in terms of the trade off between 
‘richness’ and ‘reach’ of information. Companies, for 
example, set up branch networks to communicate ‘rich’ 
(read detailed or complex) information to customers, whilst 
advertising could ‘reach’ a broader population, but not 
deliver rich information effectively. 
 
The authors hold that a company can increase its 
competitiveness in this situation by moving along the trade-
off line, e.g. offering higher reach but with less richness than 
a competitor. A second, but more difficult, strategy would 
be to move the line outward by offering both increased 
richness and reach.  
 
Evans and Wurster (2000b:35) predict that the trade-off line 
is not only shifted by innovative competitors. Two 
inventions are causing the line to move. The first is the 
advent of open, universal communication standards, such as 
found in Internet communication. The second is the 
introduction of content standards for the definition, storage 
and presentation of information.  
 
The effect of these changes is that rich information will 
increasingly reach a much larger audience at a greatly 
reduced cost. In addition, the market starts performing 
activities previously requiring managerial co-ordination. 
Due to this some parts of the value chain might become 
obsolete and others can be performed in new ways. The 
outcome is often that the traditional integrated value chain 
starts deconstructing. 
 
Interaction versus transformation 
 
Butler and Hall (1997:4) maintain that organisations 
consistently balance interaction cost with transformation 
cost. Interaction is defined as ‘the searching, coordinating 
and monitoring that firms do when they exchange goods, 
services or ideas’. Transformation is not as clearly defined 
but relates to the economic activities of production and 
delivery (Butler & Hall, 1997:2).  
 
The theory of comparative advantage (Carbaugh, 2002:29) 
holds that the parties should trade and increase individual 
and total wealth when one party has a comparative 
advantage in an activity. Butler and Hall (1997:4) introduce 
interaction cost as a further dimension. They hold that even 
if one party has a comparative advantage, but the cost of 
finding, negotiating and exchanging goods is more than can 
be gained through trading, the parties would not trade. 
 
Interaction is estimated to represent as much as 51 percent 
of labour activity in the United States of America (USA) 
with an equivalent cost of one third of the gross domestic 
product (Butler & Hall, 1997:). The authors (Butler & Hall, 
1997:4) postulate that due to this huge cost, traditional 
organisations were constructed to decrease the impact of 
interaction.  
 
It follows logically that should, for any reason, the cost of 
interaction decrease, the dynamics of industry could change. 
A decrease in interaction cost could, for example, lead to a 
component being sourced from a third party rather than 
manufactured in-house.  
 
Three different businesses 
 
The ‘three firms in one’ theory presents one of the most 
attractive models. This probably results from the instinctive 
recognition of the different dimensions of an organisation 
that managers have noticed through experience but were 
unable to describe in terms of a theoretical framework. 
 
Hagel and Singer (1999a:133) suggest that most 
organisations engage in three kinds of businesses. The first 
attracts customers; the second develops products, whilst the 
third oversees operations. Each unit employs different types 
of people, has different cultures and even has different 
economic and competitive imperatives. The main driver for 
the customer business is scope (gaining the largest share of 
customer wallet), whilst operations focus on scale. The 
product unit focuses on speed to market and innovation.  
 
In ‘Blown to Bits’ Evans and Wurster (2000a:210) follow a 
similar approach by holding that the integrated value chains 
often found in industries are sub-optimal because they 
integrate businesses with different drivers into one.  
 
Hagel and Singer (1999b:213) agree that the trade-offs 
resulting from running the businesses as one adds 




inefficiencies is more than the interaction cost holding the 
business together, organisations will unbundle into three.  
 
The unbundled businesses are not predicted to necessarily 
remain loose standing entities. Some parts are expected to 
consolidate with similar sections of other organisations that 
have also unbundled. Consolidation in the customer and 
operations businesses is likely as the business drivers are 
scope and scale. Product companies are foreseen to remain 
small with fragmented players characterising the new 
industry. 
 
Evans and Wurster (2000a:10) argue that in the traditional 
value chain trade-offs were inevitable. One activity was 
done at a sub-optimal level to accommodate another. This 
resulted in some activities cross-subsidising others. The 
player with the lowest average cost for all activities held a 
competitive advantage. 
 
With deconstruction, ‘de-averaging’ (Evans, 1998:1) occurs. 
Each part of the value chain must now be competitive. 
‘Deconstrutors’ seek out the most profitable part of the 
chain and focus only on this element, thus gaining a 
competitive advantage. Traditional players are potentially 
left with the less profitable activities. 
 
How does deconstruction start? 
 
Prima facie the three models described present three 
different solutions to the same problem. Further analysis 
concludes that they are closely linked. The ‘three firms in 
one’ appears to present the basic theory, with ‘richness and 
reach’ and ‘interaction versus transformation’ explaining 
why the ‘three firms in one’ will deconstruct. 
 
The most probable catalyst of deconstruction in an industry 
is a new competitor entering. These competitors usually 
choose the highly profitable parts of the value chain and 
exploit averaging by offering the consumer a new value 
proposition. 
 
The second source of change is current competitors. 
Successful organisations often refuse to change unless a 
threat makes it necessary. Hagel and Singer (1999b:227) 
hold that organisations operating in markets that experience 
major technological or regulatory discontinuities are likely 
to change and unbundle because management feels highly 
threatened and thus forced into drastic actions. 
 
The dominant role of management consultants in modern 
industry cannot be underestimated. When dealing with their 
predictions about future trends in an industry one often 
contemplates whether the forecast is accurate or if the 
predictions and consulting around these predictions in fact 
shape the future. Finding an answer falls outside the scope 
of this paper. Suffice to say that when most consulting firms 





There appears to be three different theories of why 
deconstruction in the value chain occurs, namely the 
disappearance of the ‘rich versus reach’ and ‘transformation 
versus interaction’ trade-offs and the ‘three businesses in 
one’ argument. The latter is held to be the dominant model 
with the other two explaining why the three businesses 
deconstruct. 
 
United Kingdom retail life insurance industry 
 
With annual premiums of £93 billion (Association of British 
Insurers, 2003a:3), the UK life insurance market is the 
largest in Europe and the third largest in the world in terms 
of both absolute size and per capita insurance expenditure. 
Premium income as a percentage of gross domestic product 
is the second highest in the world (Association of British 
Insurers, 2003a:6).  
 
The savings industry has assets under management of more 
than £2 000 billion (Fund Managers’ Association, 2001: 6). 
Life insurance, which has a retail and wholesale component, 
represents assets under management of £840 billion (Fund 
Managers’ Association, 2001:6). Of this £600 billion is 
estimated to represent the retail sector (Association of 
British Insurers, 2003a:7).  
 
In 2001, 91 percent (Association of British Insurers, 
2003b:1) of long-term insurance premiums (including retail 
and wholesale) were attributed to 20 insurers. The rest of the 
market contains almost 200 smaller companies. Table 1 
gives a breakdown of the top 20 competitors. 
 
Table 1: 2001 top 20 insurers 
 






1 Halifax 9 077 9,8 
2 CGNU (renamed Aviva in 2002) 8 727 9,4 
3 Barclays 8 424 9,1 
4 Prudential 8 122 8,7 
5 Standard Life 7 678 8,3 
6 Lloyds TBS 5 016 5,4 
7 Legal & General 4 404 4,7 
8 AXA 3 938 4,2 
9 AEGON 3 609 3,9 
10 Zurich Financial Services 3 358 3,6 
11 Abbey National 3 291 3,5 
12 American Life 2 910 3,1 
13 National Westminster Life 2 716 2,9 
14 Friends Provident 2 646 2,9 
15 Morgan Grenfell 2 282 2,5 
16 AMP 2 051 2,2 
17 Phillips & Drew 1 873 2,0 
18 Royal & SunAlliance 1 751 1,9 
19 Royal London 1 667 1,8 
20 Skandia 1 352 1,4 
- Total Top 20 84 892 91,3 
- Total Market 93 000 100,0 
 
Source: Association of British Insurers, 2003b:1. 
 
To test the level of concentration in the market the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (US Department of Justice, 
2003:1) was used. The index is calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm and adding the results. Markets in 
which the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is between 1 000 
and 1 800 are considered moderately concentrated. An index 




Applying the formula to Table 1 results in an answer of 646, 
indicating a market that is not concentrated. Further 
consolidation in the industry is thus probable.  
 




Retail life insurance companies provide two main product 
categories, namely risk cover and savings policies. The two 
products are often packaged in one insurance policy. 
 
A pure life risk policy is a contract in which the insurer 
guarantees to pay the beneficiary an amount should the 
insured die within the predetermined period (Diacon & 
Carter, 1992:40). The life premium is calculated based on 
the life expectancy of the insured. By pooling individuals, 
insurers can offset losses on those who die earlier than 
expected against profits made on those who live longer than 
expected.  
 
The aim of a savings policy is to accumulate an underlying 
value, which is available for the policyholder at a date in the 
future (Diacon & Carter, 1992:40). The policy may also pay 
out if it is cancelled or on the death of the policyholder. 
Saving products consist mainly of with-profit, unit linked 




The products described are delivered to the market through a 
number of discrete activities which, when combined, form 
the company value chain. Marlborough Stirling (2001: 2) 
divides the life insurance value chain into the following 
activities: sales, underwriting, policy issue, customer 
interaction (e.g. call centres), claims, processing of policy 
records, accounting, capital, product development and the 
statutory actuary role. Taylor, Seah, Cannon and Stone 
(2002:351) illustrate the roles in the life insurance value 
chain by referring to three main categories of 
manufacturing, distribution and retail.  
 
In Figure 1 the respective strengths of these models were 
used and combined into one simple model that illustrates the 
five major areas of the value chain. 
 
Distribution focuses on understanding the client’s needs and 
distributing a product that meets these. The product is 
designed and packaged by the next unit. Risk management 
is closely intertwined with the insurance product as the 
actuary determines rates for risk products and bonuses 
declared on with-profit products. Asset management entails 
the selection and management of investment instruments 
purchased by cash inflows generated from the sale of 
products. Operations cover the infrastructure, information 
technology and administration processes needed to deliver 
the other services in the chain. 
 
Factors impacting on the value chain 
 
Deconstruction theory holds that rapid changes in an 
industry can ultimately result in the traditional value chain 
disintegrating. These rapid changes can originate from 
external sources, i.e. from areas such as the political, 
economic, social or technological environment (Thompson 
& Strickland, 2001:73). Alternatively, factors from within 
the industry or from another industry can create this 
discontinuance. 
 
The savings gap 
 
European countries have traditionally provided better social 
welfare than the USA or Japan. With an ageing population, 
these benefits are becoming costly and governments will 
increasingly have to find ways whereby individuals are held 
responsible for their own retirement savings. 
 
In 2002 Oliver Wyman & Company (2002:2) produced a 
report on savings levels in the UK. The firm calculated that 
the UK market has a savings gap of £27 billion per annum 
between what is needed for retirement and current saving 
levels. This represents almost 30 percent of the life 




Equity markets around the world have been volatile for a 
number of years. In the UK a similar trend has been 
observed. Investors in the equity market have often seen 
their wealth decrease rapidly. Political instability in the 




Stakeholder pensions represent one method by which 
government has attempted to fill the savings gap. They are 
mainly sold and administered by insurance companies.  
 
One of the requirements for a stakeholder product laid down 
by government is that the total administration charges may 
not exceed one percent of assets per annum (Self, 2002:1). 
This has led to the term ‘the one percent world’. The 
prediction is made that there will be increased pressure on 




Figure 1: combined value chain model 
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The ‘one percent world’ was enhanced by the introduction 
of ‘CAT standards’ by the Financial Services Authority. 
CAT is an abbreviation for fair Charges, easy Access and 




Due to the concern over the levels of savings in the UK 
market the Treasury tasked Ron Sandler to investigate the 
medium and long-term retail savings industry. 
 
The Sandler report was released in July 2002. The main 
recommendations (Ernst & Young, 2002:1) include: 
 
• A split between ‘with advice’ and ‘without advice’ 
products, with the former sold without commission 
(i.e. advice is fee based instead of commission driven). 
 
• The term ‘independent advisor’ being reserved for 
people selling fees based products. 
 
Polarisation and depolarisation 
 
The Financial Services Act of 1986 introduced the concept 
of polarisation. This regime divided firms selling insurance 
products into two groups, Independent Financial Advisors 
(IFA’s) and representatives of insurance companies 
(Financial Services Authority, 2002b: 11). Representatives 
were only allowed to sell a single company’s products, 
whilst an IFA had to recommend the most suited product, 
i.e. may not sell only one company’s product.  
 
In 2002 the Financial Services Authority (2002) published a 
consultative paper (CP121) on reforming polarisation. The 
report proposes a reversal of some of the principals 
implemented under polarisation; hence the term of 
‘depolarisation’. If the proposals are implemented a new 
grouping of advisors, multi-tied agents, will be created. 
These agents will not be independent but will be able to sell 
products of a number of providers, as opposed to the one 
provider currently allowed for representatives. 
 
Pressure on capital adequacy 
 
Pension policies with guaranteed annuity rates were widely 
sold from the 1970s to the late 1980’s. These policies 
guaranteed the rate at which the cash benefit at maturity can 
be converted to an annuity (Credit Suisse First Boston, 
2002:82). With current interest rates in the region of five 
percent, these guarantees have an adverse effect on insurers 




In recent research (McKenna, 2002:36) it is estimated that 
the UK has 20 million Internet users. Of these almost half 
indicated that they have used it to buy or service a financial 
product. 
  
As shown by the low level of retail life insurance products 
sold on an execution basis only (Sandler, 2002:82), the main 
impact of the Internet on the life insurance market is, 
however, not in the area of business to consumer interaction, 
but rather as a tool for intermediaries to improve service to 
their clients. 
 
Aggregation is a concept where mainly web based 
distribution platforms gives a user access to the products of 
more than one product provider. Sandler (2002:82) refers to 
aggregators of investment products as ‘fund supermarkets’ 
and estimates that 50 percent of IFA’s have formed 
relationships with FundsNetwork (set up by US fund 
manager Fidelity Investments), Cofunds (set up by M&G, 




Insurance companies adopted computer technology soon 
after its introduction. Because policies are sold for long 
terms, it is difficult to decommission systems while policies 
administered on them are still in force. Sandler (2002:169) 
estimates that some companies have as many as 17 core 
information technology (IT) systems. To effectively address 
the resultant problems, companies need to rationalise the 
number of different products on their books. Changing of 
contracts is, however, not an easy process, as policyholders 
need to agree to the changes. Few companies are thus 
willing to embark on this route. 
 
Legacy problems have increased recently due to large-scale 
consolidation in the industry. The effect is that many of the 
larger insurers have legacy systems causing service 
difficulties. In the chairman’s statement accompanying the 
interim report, Aviva (2002:3) recognised that integrating 
many legacy systems is time consuming and that due to this 




The UK has a savings gap of £27 billion. Government is 
pressured to find a solution to this economic problem. 
Regulatory activities focus on reform to simplify the 
industry. The rationale is that by doing this the consumer 
will be encouraged to save more. At the same time 
consumer protection is a major concern due to previous 
scandals such as the mis-selling of pensions. On the 
technology front the main factors impacting are the 
increasing prominence of the Internet and the vast number 
of legacy systems that need to be maintained.  
 
Deconstruction of the value chain 
 
Quite a few instances of deconstruction can be observed in 
various parts of the insurance value chain. In addition, the 
factors discussed above are likely to lead to future 





Polarisation in the late eighties led to the increased use of 
IFA’s as distributors. Since 1991 it is estimated that the 
number of individuals in direct sales forces has reduced from 





A move from tied agents to independent advisors was a 
form of deconstruction. Where the life insurer previously 
owned the whole value chain via the company sales force, a 
different organisation (the IFA) now owned part of the 
distribution function. Although the industry had already 
started to deconstruct in this manner prior to 1992, 
polarisation materially increased its pace. 
 
If depolarisation should lead to the increased use of agents, 
this could be seen as at least a partial reversal of 
deconstruction, indicating that deconstruction is not 
permanent. If the impact is the consolidation of IFA’s, this 
fits in with that part of deconstruction theory that holds that 
the deconstructed distribution organisations will reconstruct 
in order to gain benefits of scope.  
 
The distribution element of the value chain has, and is likely 
to continue experiencing various forms of deconstruction, 
including full, partial and even the reversal of 
deconstruction. 
 
Product development and risk management 
 
On the investment product front a view is emerging that the 
basics of investment is asset allocation. Only once the asset 
allocation has been satisfied a product type is selected. The 
product type is selected based on criteria such as cost, tax 
and regulatory ‘wrapper’ of the product.  
 
For savings products this thinking brings life policies in 
direct competition with investments such as unit trusts and 
other open ended collective investments. A new type of 
product company offering a generic investment product is 
predicted. This will result in parts of the industry value 
chains of insurers, unit trusts and other retail savings 
product providers being amalgamated into one product 
provider offering a number of generic investment products 
‘wrapped’ as the buyer requires.  
 
One effect of the increased competition between life and 
other savings products will be the vast number of choices 
available to investors and the confusion that this is likely to 
create. Credit Suisse First Boston (2002:84) predicts that the 
‘shelf space’ of IFA’s is limited, as too many options will 
confuse consumers. This will, in their opinion, lead to a 
‘flight to quality’ to the large financially strong insurers. 
  
No obvious examples of deconstruction for risk products 
could be found in the market yet. As risk products are 
becoming commodities where price is the main determinant 
of the sale, scale requirements will likely lead to changes in 
the value chain of this product. Although some niche 
opportunities will be available, most likely in the more 
affluent end of the market where scale can be achieved with 
fewer clients, it is predicted that smaller companies in the 




The asset management part of the value chain has not seen a 
large amount of deconstruction in the traditional sense 
where a part of the value chains breaks away. This is 
possibly due to the profitability of the activities. This does 
not mean that no form of deconstruction has been observed. 
 
The effective market hypothesis holds that because the 
market prices equities based on all relevant information, an 
investor should not be able to outperform the market on a 
consistent basis (Damodaran, 2001:23). The rule of thumb is 
that only 25 percent of actively managed funds are able to 
outperform the index at one time (The Motley Fool, 2003:1). 
This has lead to the increased popularity of index-based 
(tracking) products. In tracking, the asset manager creates a 
portfolio that mirrors a major index (e.g. the FTSE 100) 
usually by buying the underlying investments that comprise 
the index. The only management needed is to readjust the 
portfolio when the index changes. Tracker funds currently 
account for about 30 percent of the UK investment market 
(Duncan, 2002:26).  
 
ING Barings (2001:58) holds that the value chain of 
indexers consists mainly of rebalancing, stock lending, forex 
and custody. All of these activities are highly computer 
dependent. This means that indexing is highly scaleable. 
Global companies are thus likely to dominate. Today four 
global players Barclays, State Street, Bankers Trust and 
Vanguard dominate this arena (ING Barings, 2001:58). 
 
Credit Suisse First Boston (2002:367) observes that large 
benefit consultancies are advocating a ‘core/satellite’ 
approach. This approach proposes that the bulk of funds are 
passively invested, with the remainder invested in higher 
risk vehicles. Frequently private equity and hedge 
(arbitrage) funds are used for this component. 
  
When comparing this philosophy with that of the traditional 
actively managed portfolio, one can conclude that the 
difference indicates deconstruction of the traditional actively 
managed portfolio. In the actively managed portfolio the 
elements of tracking, stock picking and arbitrage are mixed 
in one portfolio. By de-aggregating the components and 
having separate managers focus on each part, the thinking is 




In the operations area the main form of deconstruction 
appears to be outsourcing of administration to a third party. 
The logic is that the third party can gather scale, thereby 
reducing the cost of administration. The outsourcers usually 
come from a different industry or one formed from a break 
away from the traditional value chain. 
 
Outsourcing in the operations area is not a new 
phenomenon. In asset management, outsourcing of certain 
administration services is common. Myners (2001:74) 
estimates that 50 percent of asset managers used 
independent custodians in 1997. This had increased to 71 
percent in 1999.  
 
In the life industry a number of factors are impacting on the 
operations area. The introduction of stakeholder pensions 
introduced the one percent world. Due to the pressure to 
achieve lower cost, increased outsourcing activities are 




administration of life products is becoming increasingly 
technical and cumbersome. This is likely to further increase 
the demand for outsourcing specialist companies. 
 
Due to consolidation in the industry, several companies have 
a number of ‘legacy’ systems inherited from companies 
acquired. To integrate these systems with their own systems 
requires enormous recourses.  
 
The main advantage of outsourcing is the cost saving that 
can be achieved by benefits of scale. The main mitigating 
factors against it seem to be the loss of the ability to 
differentiate, loss of control and labour opposition. 
Outsourcing may be limited to the closed book market. In 
the open book market it seems unlikely that a large switch to 
outsourcing will occur, as service might be one of the only 




It appears that deconstruction is a reality in almost all parts 
of the value chain. The level of deconstruction, however, 
differs. Instead of total disintegration, deconstruction is 
often found to co-exist with the current integrated value 
chain model. This is an important principle when alternative 
strategies are explored. The lesson seems to be that an 
overly simplistic model of the industry will lead to one-
dimensional solutions, which are likely to lead to failure. 
 
Exploring strategic options for a new entrant 
 
Evans and Wurster (2000a:60) hold that due to the simpler 
model that deconstructed businesses follow, less strategic 
options are available. These options are Scale, Scope or 
Speed. This means that competition is fiercer but also that 
monopoly formation is often the logical consequence of the 
strategies available.  
 
Deconstruction is, however, not an overnight switch but a 
process wrought with uncertainty. It is seldom complete but 
rather takes the form of partial unbundling. The challenge 
will thus be to formulate a strategy that combines those 
developed for a deconstructed industry with those of a 




In the customer aggregation arena a differentiating strategy 
is most likely needed to be successful. The ability to attract 
customers is the single most important success factor. To 
attract customers requires a combination of branding, 
presence (either physical or perceived) and trust by 
consumers.  
 
The UK market already has a considerable number of IFA 
firms and networks. In order to be successful a new entrant 
will need to build or acquire a presence and a brand. With 
11 000 IFA firms already in the market, it will be difficult to 
establish a new brand. One of the lessons that the dot-com 
era has taught us is the prohibitively high cost of 
establishing a brand and attracting new customers (Cap 
Gemini Ernst & Young, 2001:16). Building a consumer 
brand will require large investment in an already fragmented 
market. Even if it this could be achieved, the ease of 
acquiring an existing IFA must be more cost and time 
effective. 
 
A second success factor that is needed in the IFA market 
arises due to the prevalent role that commission plays as the 
major source of income. Commission is paid by life 
companies to reward agents for selling products. 
Commission levels have been deregulated in the UK (Boles, 
2002:2). 
 
It seems to be common practice that larger IFA firms, with 
more muscle due to their ability to switch large amounts of 
client money, are able to negotiate larger commissions than 
smaller firms (Boles, 2002:2). This means that scale has an 
added advantage in this market. Investing in a small firm 
will thus place a new entrant at an immediate disadvantage 




It is predicted that the roles of risk manager, product 
development and packaging will be combined in most cases 
and that this is the area where most current life companies 
will operate. The competition in this market will thus remain 
high. 
 
Boyd, Walker and Larreche (1998:241) hold that branding is 
particularly important when it is difficult to measure a 
product’s quality. The quality of life products are by their 
nature impossible to measure when the product is sold. The 
brand of the insurer as a large stable organisation is 
probably the only criterion that the average client has who 
understands little of capital adequacy and reserving.  
 
In the product market a new entrant will thus have to buy a 
company with an existing brand as a stable product 
provider. Credit Suisse First Boston (2002:386) agrees with 
this sentiment when they state, ‘we believe a strong brand is 
a fundamental requirement for success in the UK life and 
pensions market’. This will probably mean that a new 
entrant needs to make an investment in one of the top 20 




With the majority of retail assets still invested in managed 
portfolios, there must be a future for active managers. 
However, once again, for an organisation to be trusted to 
invest the assets of a product provider and packager it must 
have a solid track record in investment management.  
 
As previously indicated the indexing element of investment 
management is a global industry with a few multinationals 
dominating. The chances of entering this part of the market 
seem unlikely as it will be difficult to achieve the scale 
needed to be profitable. 
 
Hedge funds originated in the United States of America 
(USA) and large competitors from this country are likely to 
dominate this area of the UK market in future. Again a niche 







Competitors in the operations market sells to corporates. 
The key success factor will likely be the ability to deliver 
rather than the retail requirements of advertising and brand 
building. This could be an advantage for a new entrant as 
marketing can be done in a more focussed way, which could 
be less expensive.  
 
In the operations area offshore outsourcing, especially to 
India, is becoming more attractive. Co-operating with an 





The asset management and operations areas of the value 
chain could offer some options for new investors. The 
distribution area, with a large number of competitors, 
however, seems to offer the most attractive opportunities. 
By consolidating a number of these competitors, benefits of 




The paper demonstrates that the deconstruction of the value 
chain model can be a useful tool to help a company 
formulate a strategy for entering a deconstructing industry. 
The model’s main advantage is that it clearly highlights the 
areas in the value chain where the traditional strategies of 
differentiation, cost leadership and focus can be applied.  
 
The theory of value chain deconstruction is likely to gain 
increased popularity. As with most models, a thorough 
understanding of its strengths and shortcoming is needed. In 
addition, industry and company specific knowledge is 
required otherwise the application of the model can have 
disastrous consequences. Finally, if common sense does not 
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